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Abstract 
The 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics has been awarded to Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, 
and Roger Myerson, for their contributions to mechanism design theory. The article dis-
cusses the importance of mechanism design theory for modern economics, focusing on 
some of its implications for economic policy making. 
1. Introduction
1
An important feature of settings in which collective decisions are made is that 
individuals’ preferences are not publicly observable. As a result, individuals must be 
relied upon to reveal this information. How the information can be elicited, and the ex-
tent to which the information revelation problem constrains the ways in which col-
lective decisions can respond to individual preferences, is known as the mechanism 
design problem. The part of economic theory that studies the mechanism design pro-
blem is called, unsurprisingly, mechanism design theory. 
The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences has recognized the importance of 
mechanism design theory by awarding the 2007 Nobel Prize in economic sciences to 
three economists who provided major contributions to the development of this theo-
ry: Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, and Roger Myerson.  
Mechanism design theory may seem to be a very arcane area of economics. 
Indeed, most basic economics textbooks include little if any reference to this part of 
economic theory.
2 Newspaper articles trying to explain this theory after the Nobel 
Prize announcement struggled to come up with easy-to-understand illustrations, not-
ing in one case, for example, that ‘Maskin monotonicity’ might not be “the sort of 
thing to mention at parties” (Economist, 2007). Nonetheless, the theory has important 
contributions both for modern economics and for real life.  
Mechanism design theory goes to the heart of one of the biggest challenges in 
economics: how to arrange economic interactions so that, when everybody behaves 
in a self-interested manner, the result is something acceptable to all. The word “me-
chanism” refers to the institutions and the rules of the game that govern economic 
activities, which can range from a planning commission in a command economy to 
trading in a market.  
The remainder of this text provides an overview of the major developments in 
mechanism design theory, including its key concepts and results. It also provides 
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a discussion of the theory’s various applications, focusing on those relating to eco-
nomic policy. 
2. Key Concepts and Results 
The development of mechanism design theory originated with the work of Leo-
nid Hurwicz (1960). At the time, there was still a very active debate about the pros 
and  cons  of  central  planning  and  the market  mechanism.  Hurwicz  agreed  with 
Friedrich von Hayek (1945) and others who argued that the dispersion of information 
among numerous economic agents was at the heart of the failure of central planning. 
However, he pointed out that the problem went even deeper than information disper-
sion. He observed that there was a lack of incentives for economic agents to share 
their information truthfully with others (and in particular with the government). More-
over, Hurwitz showed that although the market mechanism was far less afflicted than 
central planning by such incentive problems, it was by no means immune from them.  
Hurwitz (1972) introduced this idea to economics by coining the term of “in-
centive compatibility”. The intuition behind incentive compatibility is that to get as 
close as possible to the most efficient economic outcome, there needs to be a mecha-
nism in which everybody does best for themselves by sharing truthfully whatever 
private information they have. Hurwicz showed that even such a mechanism cannot 
guarantee an optimal outcome, because even if everyone’s incentives are compatible, 
the mere existence of private (asymmetric) information precludes Pareto efficiency 
(i.e., a situation where no one can be made better off without someone becoming 
worse off). But such a mechanism will get closer to Pareto efficiency than if incen-
tives are incompatible (i.e., if some people can do better by not sharing information 
or by lying). Mechanism design strives to achieve “incentive efficiency”: given com-
patible incentives, no one can do better without someone doing worse. 
Roger Myerson’s main contribution to mechanism design theory is his work 
on the “revelation principle”, a mathematical method that simplifies the calculation 
of the most efficient rules of the game for getting people to reveal their private in-
formation truthfully. The revelation principle is an insight that greatly simplifies 
the analysis of mechanism design problems. It states that when searching for the best 
possible mechanism to solve a given problem, it is possible to look only at a small 
subclass of mechanisms, namely, so-called direct mechanisms, which satisfy Hur-
wicz’s condition of incentive compatibility. 
While direct mechanisms are not intended as descriptions of real-world in-
stitutions, their mathematical structure makes them amenable to analysis. Finding 
the best of all direct mechanisms for a given problem is often straightforward, and 
once the best direct mechanism has been found, the researcher can “translate back” 
that mechanism into a more realistic mechanism. By this seemingly roundabout me-
thod, researchers have been able to solve problems of institutional design that would 
otherwise have been effectively intractable. 
Gibbard (1973) formulated the first version of the revelation principle. Several 
researchers, including Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979) and Myerson (1979), 
independently extended it to the standard notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium, 
which proved an important stepping stone for subsequent research. Myerson (1979, 
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Eric Maskin’s key contribution was implementation theory, which clarified 
when mechanisms can be designed that only produce incentive-efficient equilibria. 
The work on the revelation principle by Myerson and others transformed the analysis 
of economic mechanisms, but an important problem remained. In many cases, a me-
chanism admits several different equilibria. Even if the best outcome is achieved in 
one equilibrium, inferior equilibria may also exist. For instance, standard double auc-
tions usually have multiple equilibria, some of them associated with very low trade 
volumes. It would therefore be very useful if a mechanism could be designed such 
that all its equilibria are optimal. Maskin (1977) provided the first general solution 
to this problem. The resulting theory, known as implementation theory, has become 
a key part of modern mechanism design. 
The work of the 2007 Nobel Prize winners is closely related to that of several 
earlier laureates. These include, in particular, John Harsanyi, John Nash, and Rein-
hard Selten (the 1994 winners, for non-cooperative game theory), and James Mirrlees 
and William Vickrey (the 1996 winners, for the theory of incentives under asym-
metric information). 
3. Range of Applications 
Mechanism design theory has a wide and growing range of applications through- 
out modern economics and in real life. In awarding the prize, the Royal Swedish Aca-
demy of Sciences specifically noted the theory’s applications to trading mechanisms, 
regulation schemes, and voting procedures. Real-world applications include topics rang-
ing from utility regulation and auctions to structuring the pay of company executives 
and the design of elections. The theoretical work has led to more effective regulatory 
concepts, such as the design of optimal auctions (Myerson, 1981) that give the partici-
pants an incentive to reveal their private information, enabling everyone to benefit.  
The following example is an illustration of how trade can break down if infor-
mation held by buyers or sellers is private. For instance, a company might say it is 
only willing to sell a product for EUR 30 when in fact it would make a profit even if 
the product was sold it for EUR 20. Another company might say it is only willing to 
buy the product at EUR 15 when it would really pay up to EUR 25. In this case, trade 
is possible in the range from EUR 20 to EUR 25, but the transaction might not occur 
because both the buyer and the seller have an incentive to misrepresent their true po-
sitions. The incentives to hide private costs are high in regulated industries. 
Since the 1980s, rapid growth in mechanism design theory’s applications has 
been enabled by the boom in computing power, which has allowed mechanism de-
sign to be taken to a new level of sophistication and complexity. The theory has in-
creasingly been put to work on tasks ranging from how to auction a radio spectrum to 
devising a better way of paying contractors than cost-plus contracts (which give con-
tractors incentives to be inefficient) or fixed-price contracts (which often lead to 
overpaying). Myerson (1979, 1982, 1986) was the first to apply mechanism design 
theory (and in particular the revelation principle) to economic problems such as auc-
tions and regulation.  
Another application of the theory that has attracted a substantial amount of inte-
rest recently is the design of environmental policies. It is an area in which Eric Maskin 
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when externalities such as pollution are nonexcludable, agents must be compelled to 
participate in a “mechanism” to ensure a Pareto-efficient outcome.  
4. International Economic Policy Coordination 
An important group of applications of mechanism design theory that has been 
somewhat overlooked relates to international economic policy making. These appli-
cations are particularly important in the current increasingly globalized world, in 
which national economic policies (e.g., monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policy, as 
well as financial crisis management policies) can have substantial repercussions for 
other countries through real and financial channels. A better understanding of these 
linkages and repercussions for policy making can thus have very practical, real-life 
implications.  
International economic policy coordination has been studied extensively (see, 
e.g., (Buiter, Marston, 1985)), usually with the help of game theory. The analysis of 
the strategic interactions among national economic policies using game theory high-
lights the “prisoner’s dilemma” features of the strategic interaction: a coordinated po-
licy response is preferable if all country authorities follow the coordinated strategy, 
but such a strategy is difficult to enforce as there are incentives for individual country 
authorities to deviate. To satisfy their own electorates, national policymakers may 
pursue policies that harm other economies, leading to suboptimal outcomes for all.  
The contribution of mechanism design theory is that it asks an important fol-
low-up question: is it possible to design the “rules of engagement” in a way that de-
livers a desirable (coordinated) strategy in the face of self-interested behavior, private 
information (i.e., information known to some policymakers but not others), and poli-
cy spillovers? In particular, a desirable feature of collective choice is (Pareto) effi-
ciency, meaning that there is no solution that would make someone better off without 
making someone else worse off. Is there a mechanism that implements such an ef-
ficient collective choice in dominant strategies, i.e., strategies that nationally-minded 
policymakers will naturally pursue? If that were the case, one could be fairly con-
fident that rational policymakers will indeed arrive at this collective choice.  
A good real world example is the globalization of financial institutions, and its 
implications for international financial crisis prevention, management, and resolu-
tion. The globalization of financial institutions has appreciable benefits for the effi-
ciency of the international financial system. However, it also comes with new risks. 
Specifically, financial systems are more prone to transmit shocks across markets 
and activities, such as those that came from the U.S. subprime mortgage market in 
2007–08. The issue is particularly pertinent for EU countries because of their com-
mitment to financial market integration, their specific cross-border regulatory set-up, 
and the emergence of pan-European financial institutions. The scope of these institu-
tions’ activities is often EU wide, but legal, regulatory, and supervisory jurisdictions 
are national, and so is accountability to the public. National confidentiality rules, for 
example, mean that national prudential authorities have access to different informa-
tion, and no authority has a complete overview of prudential developments in all of 
Europe’s major financial institutions. That is why when a crisis hits, “it could be 
a case of ‘grab what you can get’” and “in a worst case scenario supervisors will ring 
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parts of the group where they may be needed, for example for collateral provision” 
(McCreevy, 2007). In short, in the hope of limiting the damage to their country’s 
public purse, nationally-minded supervisors and policymakers may well do severe 
and unnecessary damage to EU taxpayers as a whole.  
An intriguing question is whether a mechanism can be designed that ensures 
that by working in a self-interested way all authorities reach the equivalent of a co-
operative, least-cost solution. Mechanism design theory highlights the difficulties in 
designing mechanisms leading to efficient strategies, especially in complex situations 
with numerous agents with different preferences and different informational advan-
tages over one another. One of the findings of the theory is that with “self-interested” 
behavior (i.e., behavior reflecting national preferences), private information (infor-
mation that is available only to the authority in one country) and policy spillovers 
across borders there is very likely no mechanism that makes each country policy-
maker confident that he can act in the common good without risks or costs to his 
national economy. 
The following is a somewhat more formal illustration of the same point, for 
the case of the financial supervision framework. The mechanism design problem is 
a fitting description of the cross-border financial supervision framework: a number of 
diverse agents (the national supervisory agencies, supervised entities, and their coun-
terparts) are involved, all with private information and preferences that are generally 
not known to the other agents. To illustrate the resulting problems, let us limit the sett-
ing to I national supervisory agencies, indexed by i = 1, ..., I. These supervisory 
agencies must address a cross-border financial crisis by collectively choosing from 
a set X of possible resolutions a specific resolution x. Prior to the choice, each super-
visor i privately gathers an information signal, și (drawn from a prior distribution), 
which determines his ranking of the possible resolutions. The set of possible rankings 
of resolutions for supervisor i is denoted Ĭi. Each supervisor i is assumed to ma-
ximize expected utility, with a Bernoulli utility function ui(x, și). The ordinal pre-
ference relation over the various resolutions x in X associated with utility function 
ui(x, și) is denoted  ii () T   . Supervisor i’s set of possible preference relations over X
is therefore given by 
^` () ii i i i i i :f o r s o m e TT 4         
i.e.,  his  preference  ordering  over  alternative  resolutions  x i s  a   f u nction  of  the in-
formation signal și. Furthermore, assume that the optimal collective decision depends 
on the full information set ș = (ș1, ..., șI,) because of the likely cross-border spill-
overs of domestic actions in a financial crisis. To capture this dependence, the li-
terature introduces the notion of a collective choice function, defined as a function f:
Ĭ1×... ×ĬI ĺ X that, for each possible profile of the supervisors’ information signals 
(ș1, ..., șI,), assigns a collective choice  1 I f( ,..., ) X TT  , henceforth f(.). A desirable 
feature of the collective choice function is ex-post efficiency, defined as a situation 
where for no set of information signals ș = (ș1, ..., șI,) is there an  x X  such that 
ui(x, și)  ui(f (ș), și) for every i, and ui(x, și) > ui(f (ș), și) for some i: in other words, 
no x exists that makes one supervisor better off without making someone else worse 
off. Another desirable feature is dominant strategy implementation: if a mechanism 
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pervisor  who  has  a (weakly)  dominant  strategy  will  indeed  play  it.  This  imple-
mentation will be robust even if supervisors have incorrect, and even contradictory, 
beliefs about the distribution of information signal realizations.  
Unfortunately, in many cases, including a cross-border financial crisis, it is 
impossible to implement ex post efficient collective choice functions in dominant 
strategies. If the set of possible information signals is sufficiently rich (which is 
the case in major cross-border bank failures), then no collective choice function that 
is implementable in dominant strategies is also ex post efficient (Green and Laf- 
font, (1979), provide a proof)). Specifically, a resolution alternative is now a vector 
x = (k, t1,.., tI), where k denotes the resolution choice out of the set K and ti monetary 
transfers between national economies. Suppose that for each supervisor 
i = 1, ...., I, ^` () ii ii v,: TT4 X   
that is, every possible valuation function from K to  arises for some  ii T4  . In 
other words, each supervisor is likely to see many possible resolutions to a crisis and, 
depending on his private information signal și, orders and values these resolutions 
differently based on their expected costs to the national economy. Even allowing for 
monetary transfers among the supervisors’ national economies, there is no collective 
choice function   1 () () () () I fk * , t , ...,t      , where k* denotes a function that for all  






vk , vk , f o ra l lk K TT T
  









Thus, with “self-interested” behavior (i.e., behavior reflecting the nationally-based 
accountability of supervisors) and private information, there is no mechanism (in-
cluding burden sharing) that makes each supervisor confident that he can reveal his 
private information without costs to his national economy. What is needed for ef-
ficiency is collective (joint) responsibility and accountability of national supervisors, 
including collective crisis cost minimization.
3
This result of mechanism design theory implies that, to maximize their well- 
-being, interconnected countries need to devise policy frameworks that internalize 
the spillovers their policies have on each other, thereby limiting “self-interested” be-
havior that is costly to others. This entails accepting more joint responsibility and ac-
countability. Returning to the above example of EU financial stability, this seems to 
be the direction in which European policymakers intend to move, as illustrated by 
the October 9, 2007, ECOFIN agreement, which adopted a set of common principles 
for cross-border financial crisis management in cases with a potential systemic di-
mension.
4 The principles underscore the need for much closer cooperation between 
national authorities, in the interest of the common good. Specifically, they impose 
joint responsibility by prescribing that cross-border crisis management should aim to 
protect the stability of the financial system in all countries involved and in the EU as 
a whole, at the lowest overall collective cost. They internalize spillovers by arguing 
that the direct budgetary net costs resulting from managing a crisis should be shared 
between the affected countries, on the basis of equitable and balanced criteria. The les-
3 This discussion is adapted from ýihák and Decressin (2007).  
4 See ECOFIN materials at: 
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son of mechanism design theory is that these laudable intentions need to be opera-
tionalized with “rules of engagement” that will ensure cooperative behavior – rules 
that will necessarily entail sacrificing some national authority. The question now is 
how far policymakers are prepared to go. 
5. Conclusion 
Mechanism design theory addresses one of the biggest challenges in econo-
mics: how to arrange economic interactions so that, when everybody behaves in 
a self-interested manner, the result is something acceptable to all. Perhaps the key 
concept of the theory is incentive compatibility, which characterizes mechanisms in 
which everybody does best for themselves by sharing truthfully  whatever private 
information they have.  
The theory has numerous important applications. This article has focused on 
those for international policy making. The results of mechanism design theory in this 
area imply that countries need to devise policy frameworks that internalize the policy 
spillovers. This entails accepting more joint responsibility and accountability. It is 
perhaps in this spirit that one should view the IMF’s Multilateral Consultations (IMF, 
2007), under which authorities from some of the world’s major economies agreed to 
publish jointly national policy actions that should in time generate a significant re-
duction in global current account imbalances. Similarly, should a major cross-border 
financial crisis strike in Europe, EU policymakers will have to act with a view to 
minimizing the EU-wide costs. In short, yesterday’s Nobel prize-winning theories are 
deservedly finding their applications today, including in the realm of international 
economic policy making. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 1-2                                           89
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